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CHUNGKING CABINET SHIFTS REFLECT DEMANDS FOR REFORM

THE shake-up of the Chinese government on November 20 constitutes a highly significant development in Chungking politics. General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, and Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, have been deprived of these posts. At the same time there has been a reshuffling of officials within the cabinet, and one new man, General Chen Cheng, a progressive military leader who in recent years has opposed civil war and favored internal military reorganization, has been added to the government as Minister of War. Although caution is required in judging the long-term effects of these moves, the reorganization reflects the increasing pressure of the Chinese people for reforms, the insistence of the United States on changes beneficial to the war effort, and the desperate position in which Chungking has been placed by Japan's recent offensives.

OUTCOME IN DOUBT. The current shift is welcome but does not indicate decisively where the Chinese government is going from here. Ho Ying-chin remains as Army Chief of Staff; H. H. Kung continues as Vice President of the Executive Yuan, and chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of China and Central Bank of China; and Chen Li-fu, while ceasing to be Minister of Education, has taken over the key post of Minister of Kuomintang Organization, which puts him in charge of all branches of the official political party. As an Associated Press correspondent notes, "the patronage is considerable." Moreover, Chen's successor as Minister of Education is Chu Chia-hua, a political rival, who is an equally reactionary figure. And Chang Li-sheng, the new Minister of the Interior, who will be in charge of the police and various administrative units, is reported to belong to Chen Li-fu's political group.

It remains to be seen whether the present ministerial changes are a prelude to a more thorough overhauling of the Chungking régime and the adoption

of new policies. Will the removal of Ho, for example, end the military blockade against the guerrilla areas in the Northwest? Will Kung's replacement by his Vice Minister of Finance, O.K. Yui, result in a vigorous offensive against hoarders and profiteers? And will the new Minister of Education permit freedom of speech in China's schools and universities? It may be assumed that Chen Cheng will press strongly for military reorganization, since he has been on the side of army reform for a long time. But effective military change will require political progress, for the home and war fronts are mutually interdependent.

COALITION OR NOT? The crucial issue raised by the current cabinet shifts is whether Chungking will move forward to establish a coalition régime, containing representatives not only of the Kuomintang, but also of the Communists and of third-party, liberal elements. Only a government of true national unity can hope to deal with the critical situation now confronting the Chinese people. The Japanese, having taken the key Kwangsi cities of Kweilin and Liuchow, are pressing inland in the general direction of Kweiyang, capital of Kweichow province. They still have a considerable distance to go, but if Kweiyang should fall, the road link between Chungking and Kunming, chief supply center of the south, would be broken. This would nullify to a large extent the results expected from the construction of the Ledo Road and the Calcutta-Yunnan pipeline and would bottle the Chungking government up in the western provinces as never before.

The demand for a coalition government has been rising within Chungking itself. On October 9, eve of the anniversary of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan and son of Sun Yat-sen, urged that the Kuomintang give up "political tutelage," i.e., one-party government. Recently a meeting of more than 500 persons,

including important political figures, voted unanimously to request the establishment of a coalition administration. Among those participating were General Feng Yu-hsiang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee, and Tan Cheng, Vice President of the Judicial Yuan. General Feng warned: "Unless we make far-reaching reforms now we will very soon see the disintegration of our country." Tan commented on the fact that, although the Chinese Republic has existed for 33 years, it is still necessary to talk about establishing democracy at an early date.

OUR STAKE IN CHINESE DEMOCRACY. One thing Americans should never forget is that, while we desire to see China become as democratic as possible because we like to see democracy spread over the world, our interest is much more concrete and

"selfish" than this. The development of democratic unity in China would enable the Chinese people to fight Japan more effectively, to play a vigorous role in the preservation of peace after Japan's defeat, and to carry through internal reforms needed for the expansion of the China market in which American businessmen are so deeply interested. A progressive China therefore means a great deal to the United States in terms of the number of American lives required to defeat Japan, the number of American jobs after the war, and the possibility of avoiding a third world war. This is why in the weeks and months ahead the American public will have reason to be concerned about whether the cabinet changes in Chungking are followed by basic alterations of policy and the creation of a genuine coalition government.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

WHY GERMANY SURRENDERED LAST TIME

As the mighty Allied offensive unfolds along the Western front on which the Germans had hoped to dig in for the winter, the thoughts of those who lived through the first World War inevitably turn to the bleak days of another November, 26 years ago, when the newly formed government of Prince Max of Baden, at the urgent demand of Ludendorff and Hindenburg, sought and obtained an armistice from the Allies. Is the present military situation comparable to that of 1918? Why did Germany decide to sue for peace at that time? What caused the Allies to consider Germany's plea?

GERMANY'S EXHAUSTION IN 1918. The answers to many of these questions are found in an extraordinarily timely book, *Armistice 1918*, by Harry Rudin. This book points out that, in spite of the efforts of German nationalists and especially the Nazis to blame Socialists, pacifists, Jews and others on the home front for initiating armistice negotiations, the first demand for suspension of hostilities came from the German Army on September 28, 1918 when Ludendorff, fearing that Allied offensives would at any moment result in a break-through, insisted that the Foreign Office approach the Allies without delay concerning the possibility of an armistice.

In explaining the urgency of the situation to civilian officials, Ludendorff emphasized four main causes for what he regarded as an impending catastrophe: the lack of German reserves, as compared with the uninterrupted flow into France of unwearied American troops; the sudden appearance on the Western front of tanks, which at first had demoralized the Germans; the defection of Germany's allies, Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary; and poor morale on the home front, which in turn was attributed by civilian authorities to increasing shortages of essential goods, notably potatoes, fats, and clothing.

In this war, as compared with World War I, Ger-

many—by farsighted planning which took the deficiencies of 1914-18 carefully into account—has succeeded in fighting for an additional year. As in 1918, it is faced with lack of military reserves at a time when fresh American forces are spearheading the Allied offensive. It has lost all its allies and satellites—Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary. Japan, an ally of the Western powers in World War I, is still on Germany's side, but unable to offer direct assistance. In one essential respect, however, there is no comparison between 1918 and 1944. This time the development the Germans most dreaded in 1918—and hoped to avert by suing for an armistice—has occurred. The Allies have invaded German soil. To meet this invasion, the Nazis have taken a measure the civilian authorities considered in 1918 but abandoned on the advice of Ludendorff. They have ordered a *levée en masse* by forcing all remaining men capable of bearing arms to serve in the *Volkssturm*, a home guard. Such a measure, Ludendorff declared in 1918, could not save the Germans.

ALLIES EAGER FOR PEACE IN 1918. The Allies, for their part, were not only willing to receive the German armistice mission, but feared that the terms their military leaders wanted to impose might be so severe as to prove unacceptable in Berlin. Russia was out of the war, and had been forced to relinquish Russian Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 3, 1918. France and Britain were both profoundly war-weary and, although encouraged by the increasing assistance of the United States, were apprehensive about the social consequences of another winter of conflict. So much was said later about the intransigence of the French that one tends to forget that Clemenceau and Foch both welcomed the prospect of an armistice. The only prominent spokesman who urged the Allies to carry the war into Germany

was General Pershing—and his advice was set aside by President Wilson and Colonel House as well as by the French and British.

FEAR OF BOLSHEVISM IN 1918. The factor which, above all others, persuaded both the Germans and the Allies to suspend hostilities in 1918 was fear that Russian Bolshevism would spread to Germany, and thence to the rest of Europe. Germany's military leaders appear to have been less affected by this fear than the Social Democrats, who were haunted by the thought that, if peace did not come promptly, the extremist Independent Socialists would wean the masses away from them and make common cause with Russia. It was the Social Democrat Ebert who, upon succeeding Prince Max as Chancellor in the dark days when German sailors were mutinying in Kiel and Hamburg, authorized conclusion of the armistice signed on November 11 in the historic forest of Compiègne—where Hitler, events having come full circle, forced Marshal Pétain to sign France's armistice with Germany in June 1940. The skeptical French had strong doubts about the Bolshevik threat, regarding it, prophetically, as a German stratagem designed to win more favorable terms for Germany—but the other Allies tended to share the view of the German Social Democrats. The question whether, if the Allies had allowed Germany's incipient revolutionary movement to run its course, the Germans would have emerged with a political, social and economic system better prepared for peacetime collaboration with other nations than that achieved under the Weimar Republic, will always remain one of the baffling "ifs" of history.

WHAT WILL GERMANY DO THIS TIME?
Sooner or later in this war the Germans will have to

make the decision reached by Ludendorff in August 1918. But even if the German Army had favored an armistice last summer, when German troops were still on foreign soil—as the coup against Hitler would indicate—they would have been balked by three factors that did not exist in 1918. Today the Nazis have such a grip on the German people that, without their consent—which for them would be tantamount to suicide—no group in Germany, no matter how sincerely disposed to collaborate with the Allies, could make its voice heard abroad. The Allied governments, too, have been hardened by the experience of two wars with Germany, and are determined to obtain Germany's unconditional surrender on its own soil. And, in contrast to 1918, the United States, Britain and France are in a position to work with, not against, Russia. Yet it would be self-deception to overlook the fact that the peoples of liberated Europe, as we can see in different degrees in Belgium and Italy, are exhausted by years of war and privation, and inured to lawlessness by their heroic efforts to resist Hitler's illegal "new order." Nor has fear of Bolshevism, during the intervening quarter of a century, by any means vanished from the scene. Hunger, misery, disease, the tragic habits of terrorism and brutality bred of war cannot but create political extremism. Even if Russia had never existed, and Lenin had never hoisted the flag of Communist revolution in Petrograd in November 1917, Europe, including Germany, would be faced today with the social and economic upheavals which were temporarily checked by the armistice of 1918, but remained unresolved during the 25-year reprieve that should have been used by all nations to alleviate the causes of war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

LATIN AMERICANS APPRAISE THEIR PROSPECTS IN POSTWAR WORLD

The preliminary exchange of views among the American republics on post-war security objectives was concluded with the announcement on November 13 by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius that the Dumbarton Oaks charter had been provisionally discussed and approved by all Latin American nations with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations. The consultations have taken the form of individual conferences between Mr. Stettinius and Latin American diplomatic representatives in Washington; and are merely designed to invite comment on the project thus far tentatively drafted.

For months the Latin American states have been actively engaged in post-war planning. They feel, according to Latin American press comment, that the new league to maintain peace must strike a compromise between a "big power plan," whereby the Allies would constitute themselves the guardians of the peace and distribute world leadership into three or

four spheres of influence, and the "union of nations" envisaged in the "sane principles of liberty and equality" established by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. For while Latin American political thinkers realize that the major responsibility for the preservation of peace must necessarily be assumed by the great powers, they are not convinced that Britain and the United States will jettison the principles of the Atlantic Charter by entirely disregarding the rights of small nations to a share in security decisions.

The opportunity freely to study and discuss the Dumbarton Oaks proposals extended by Secretary Hull was welcomed by Latin Americans in a "better-late-than-never" spirit. An editorial published some months ago in the Chilean daily, *El Mercurio*, expressed the prevailing sentiment when it said that Latin America would no longer be content to play the role of "poor relation" assigned to it at the preliminary discussions of the League Covenant in 1919. The middle and small nations of the New World

feel they represent a political, economic and moral force which cannot be disregarded. These governments, therefore, resent the tardiness of the United States in obtaining their views on organization for peace, especially since, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington was swift to consult with them on how best to mobilize for war.*

RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS. First reading of the Dumbarton Oaks charter has aroused opinions as vigorous as they are diverse. With the exception of Uruguay and Venezuela, the Latin American chancelleries have not issued official statements of their position on the proposed organization. But, unofficially, considerable fault has been found with the absence of strong guarantees and adequate representation for the small nations in the proposed organization. Mexican editorials point out that, whereas the Assembly will be nothing more than a "lower house" with facilities for debate, the Council, an "upper house" of the powers-elect, alone will have freedom of action. In the first authoritative criticism of the Dumbarton Oaks document to come from a small nation, Uruguay instructed its Ambassador to Washington to suggest that if stronger representation for small states was not to be provided for, it might be better to revive and modernize the old League of Nations.

This insistence on the juridical equality of states under the law of nations is a principle to which these states adhered as a body throughout their participation in the League of Nations. It is not strange, therefore, that the same criticism which was made repeatedly of the League Council should again be voiced in connection with the proposed composition of the Security Council. While there are indications, of course, that the Latin American nations are prepared to accept the Dumbarton Oaks document as a first step, the ideal solution from their point of view would be an executive council elected by the proposed General Assembly of the United Nations.

AN AMERICAN BLOC? The scope of Pan American machinery for the maintenance of peace within the proposed framework promises to be as live an issue in the coming discussions as it was in the early history of the League. There seems to be little disagreement among Latin American spokesmen that much of the American experience in international collaboration might well be incorporated into the projected world organization. Considerable difference of opinion exists, however, as to the respective jurisdiction of the Pan American Union and

the over-all world security organization. Some hold that purely American problems should be handled through existing or special American institutions; while others believe that disputes arising on the American continent would actually have their origin in more far-reaching international developments and should therefore come under the jurisdiction of the United Nations organization.

In view of the need for precisely determining the relationship between the American regional union and the proposed world security organization, it is desirable to take stock of existing hemisphere relations. At more than one point, the all-American front precariously maintained through the critical war years is threatening to break down under the cumulative weight of problems directly or indirectly related to the termination of the war. Observers of the inter-American scene wonder whether this regional machinery—which, it is proposed, might serve as the model for world organization—will actually be utilized to iron out continental difficulties. Meanwhile, the Western Hemisphere is witnessing the formation of hostile alignments of American states, which might in the future undertake to solve their international problems outside the continental machinery established for such purposes. It is in order to preserve the inter-American consultative method that thoughtful Latin American leaders insistently urge the convening of the American Foreign Ministers.

OLIVE HOLMES

(The first in a series of articles on post-war Latin America.)

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*See *Bulletin*, November 10, 1944.